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Samuels: Delaware Reexamines its Merger Laws: New Protection for Minority

DELAWARE REEXAMINES ITS MERGER LAWS:
NEW PROTECTION FOR MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS?
The inquiry into how and when a parent corporation1 can
legitimately eliminate a minority interest has gained increased significance in light of the recent popularity of "going private" transactions. 2 The Supreme Court of Delaware reached this question in
Singer v. Magnavox Co., 3 which had been decided below in the
court of chancery on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court of Delaware
held that, despite technical compliance with the state's statutory
merger provisions, a long form cash-out merger 4 is improper if its
1.

A parent corporation is one which owns all of the stock of another corpora-

tion or owns enough to control it. Control has been defined as the power to cause
the corporation to do as one wishes. See Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 123
(Del. Ch. 1971). Majority stock ownership normally carries with it such control.
However, stock ownership alone, at least when it amounts to less than a majority, is
not sufficient proof of control or domination. See id. Often, control of the corporation
is concentrated in a group of insiders. An insider is a person who has special access
to information about the corporation as a result of his financial interest in the corporation or his role in the management of the corporation.
2. "Going private" is a relatively recent phenomenon. During the inflated market conditions of the late 1960's, many companies "went public" by offering equity
participation to the public. This provided needed capital and an opportunity to benefit financially from a sale of a part of their interest in the business while still retaining a substantial or majority interest. When the market declined, these same insiders
who took the company public desired to return the company to private status by
reacquiring the public shares at now deflated prices. As a result, the insiders directed the reacquisition and became the surviving shareholders in a once again privately held enterprise. This type of transaction has prompted much commentary. See,
e.g., Borden, Going Private--Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 987
(1974); Greene, Corporate Freeze-out Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L.
REV. 487 (1976); Note, The Developing Law of Corporate Freeze-outs and Going
Private, 7 Loy. CHi. L.J. 431 (1976); Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903 (1975);
Phalon, Personal Investing, Inside the Insider Buyout Boom, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24,
1977, at 28, col. 1.
3. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). The Singer decision also involved a question of
first impression concerning Delaware securities law. Construing the Delaware Securities Act, DEL. CODE tit. 6, §§ 7301-7328 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977), as a blue sky
law, the court held that a Delaware corporation is not bound by the Act simply because it is incorporated in Delaware. "[V]e do not read the Act as an attempt to
introduce Delaware commercial law into the internal affairs of corporations merely
because they are chartered here." Id. at 981.
4. A long form merger must be approved by a requisite percentage of the out-
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sole purpose is to freeze out 5 a minority interest. Further, even if a

legitimate purpose is found, the merger is still subject to judicial6

scrutiny to consider its "entire fairness" to minority stockholders.
In reaching its decision, the court relied on an amalgam of principles of fiduciary responsibility, fairness, and the concept of a
valid business purpose.
At a time when the number of unchallenged going private
transactions was steadily increasing, 7 this decision represents an
extremely prominority position from an unexpected proponent of
minority rights. Delaware is regarded as a corporate home, and the

decisions of its courts have long set the mode for the development
of corporate laws in other jurisdictions. Since Singer marks a changing attitude towards corporate management and raises serious

doubts about future corporate flexibility, this note will discuss its
precedential value for the viability of going private transactions as a
mode of future corporate combination.

standing shares of the corporation. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251 (1974 & Cum.
Supp. 1977). A minority is cashed out when the members receive cash in exchange
for surrendering their equity position in the merged corporation. See Securities Act
Release No. 5567, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 80,104,
at 85,091 (Feb. 6, 1975).
5. A freezeout has been defined as follows:
In its broadest sense, it might be taken to describe any action by those in
control of the corporation which results in the termination of a stockholder's
interest in the enterprise . . . . The term has come to imply a purpose to
force a liquidation or sale of the stockholder's shares, not incident to some
other wholesome business goal.
Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARv.
L. REv. 1189, 1192-93 (1964) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). See also
Moore, Going Private: Techniques and Problems of Eliminating the Public
Shareholder, 1 J. CORPORATION L. 321 (1976); Note, Freezing Out Minority Shareholders, 74 HARv. L. Rv. 1630 (1961).
6. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977).
7. New York had already recognized the merits of allowing a parent to bring a
subsidiary that is partially held by the public within the parental fold. See Tanzer
Economic Assocs., Inc. v. Universal Food Specialities, Inc., 87 Misc. 2d 167, 383
N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976). See also Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349 (Del.
Ch. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). Though there is no
accurate count of the number of companies that have gone private since the early
1970's when stock prices began to decline, "[olne securities lawyer who has done a
thorough study of the subject . . . estimates that at least 'several hundred' have done
a buyout and thinks that many more are likely to follow suit." Phalon, supra note 2,
at 28, col. 1. Some states, however, did disapprove of or question the propriety of
these transactions. See Albright v. Bergendahl, 391 F. Supp. 754 (D. Utah 1974);
Jutkowitz v. Bourns, No. CA 000268 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 1975); Berkowitz v.
Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 35, 342 A.2d 566 (1975).
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FREEZEOUT:

A

MEANS TO AN END

Going private describes only the incidental result in some
cases of much broader categories of transactions, all calculated to
eliminate a minority interest while the majority retains the assets
and goodwill of the enterprise. One type of going private transaction involves a controlling shareholder, itself not an operating parent, desiring to eliminate a minority interest: This is often referred
to as the true going private transaction. 8 Another variation of going
private occurs when a publicly held corporation acquires control of
a second corporation. To complete the takeover, the acquiring corporation eliminates the participation of those holding the remaining
outstanding shares in the acquired corporation.9 Similarly, when a
publicly held corporation brings a long held public subsidiary
within the parental fold and in the process eliminates the minority
interest in the subsidiary, a going private transaction has been accomplished. 10 Another variation occurs when a nonpublic parent
8. In this form of corporate combination, the controlling shareholder of corporation A places his shares of A into a newly formed private corporation. This second
corporation, B, is a shell corporation since its sole purpose is to assist in the merger
of A and B. Since the controlling shareholder, X, owns all of the outstanding shares
of B and a controlling interest of A, approval of the merger by the requisite majority
is usually a foregone conclusion. When A and B are merged, the plan of merger
provides that the remaining shareholders of A will receive cash in exchange for their
shares. Upon completion of the merger, the controlling shareholder owns all of the
stock in the new merged corporation, thus attaining the private status he sought. X
now continues to operate the very same business with no change other than the
elimination of the minority public interest. See, e.g., Jutkowitz v. Bourns, No. CA
000268 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 1975). This same technique is employed in closely
held corporations to eliminate a dissident minority. See Bryan v. Brock & Blevins, Co.,
490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974).
9. This is the typical two-step acquisition merger, of which Singer is an example. In this transaction, publicly held buyer corporation D, directly or indirectly
through a subsidiary, tenders for the stock of corporation E. Depending upon the
success of the tender offer, the acquiring corporation, D, then effects a merger using
either the long or short form merger provisions of the particular state. D, therefore,
succeeds in eliminating the minority interest of E, the acquired corporation. This
obviates the problem of a dissident minority hostile to the new management of the
now merged DE. See Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 292, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957
(Sup. Ct. 1976).
10. Here, the parent is the controlling shareholder in the subsidiary and an
operating parent. Since the parent and subsidiary are often in the same business,
there are problems of allocating common management and duplicative professional
and other costs, and questions of who will receive a corporate opportunity and even
advantages received by one entity at the expense of the other. Merging the two entities obviates these conflicts. When such a merger is effected and the minority is
paid cash for its holdings, minority members often claim to be squeezed out. See
Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462
(1977); Borden, supra note 2, at 1018-19.
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corporation freezes out the minority in a subsidiary."1 In each case,
the minority shareholders could claim that the majority is freezing them out by forcing them to relinquish their equity position.
There are a variety of techniques to accomplish a freezeout.
Mergers, pursuant to long form1 2 and short form13 provisions of
applicable state law, cash tender offers or exchange offers, 14 reverse stock splits,' 5 and sale of assets followed by dissolution of
11. When a nonpublic parent corporation effects a takeout of the minority in a
publicly held subsidiary, the remaining entity will be a private corporation. Unlike
the case of a publicly held parent corporation, which can offer the minority an equity
position in the merged corporation, the nonpublic parent can offer only cash to accomplish the takeout. See Borden, supra note 2, at 1019.
12. Use of the merger technique most often requires the existence of a second
corporation which either preexists or is a shell created solely for the merger. The
controlling shareholders of the first corporation, X, place their shares of X in a second corporation, Y. A merger of X and Y is then effected, with X's minority receiving
cash or debt securities as consideration. Since minority shareholders have no opportunity to become equity participants in the surviving corporation, this method of
merger differs from the conventional merger. In the latter, two or more operating
businesses combine and the stockholders of each corporation become equity owners
of the surviving corporation. For example, in the merger of X and Y, the holders of X
and the holders of Y will receive an equity position in the surviving XY. See Securities Act Release No. 5884, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,366, at 88,737 n.9 (Nov. 17, 1977). Long form merger statutes typically require
the approval of the holders of a specified percentage of the outstanding shares of
each corporation involved. However, proponents may already control the requisite
percentage, thereby assuring approval of the merger. In Delaware, for example,
the statute requires that only a majority approve the transaction. DEL. CODE tit. 8,
§ 251 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
13. Short form merger statutes are in effect in 38 states. The salient feature of
these statutes is that a holder of a large percentage of the outstanding shares may
cause the merger without the approval of the remaining shareholders. The required
percentages are fixed by statute and vary from state to state: in one state, 99% is
required; in nine states, 95% is necessary; in 27 of the 38 states, including Delaware,
90% is required; and in one state, the vote of 80% of the shareholders can effectuate
merger without the approval of the remaining shareholders. See Green v. Santa Fe
Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1299 n.1 (2d Cir. 1976) (Moore, J., dissenting), rev'd,
430 U.S. 462 (1977).
14. A tender offer is a device by which one can gain control by offering cash or
debt securities as consideration to existing shareholders for their shares of a corporation. While the decision to tender appears voluntary, there are pressures to accept
the offer in a going private transaction. If most shareholders accept the terms and
tender their shares, the nontendering holder may be faced with illiquidity.
Moreover, if the issuer becomes available for deregulation under the securities laws,
the nontenderer also loses the benefits and protections provided by the securities
laws. A tender offer does not require shareholder approval, but rather is dependent
for its success on the participation of the individual shareholder. See Note, Going
Private, supra note 2, at 910.
15. If the controlling interest is held in large blocks, the corporation issues one
full share of stock for a number in excess of that held in the largest block. This
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the corporation' 6 are among the more common techniques employed. These techniques typically fall into two basic categories:

one-step acquisitions of publicly held shares usually accomplished
through a simple merger; and two-step acquisitions which generally
involve a tender offer followed by one of several "mop up" devices.17

The two-step acquisition requires a mop up device because
tender offers are rarely entirely successful. A management intent
on gaining entire control can effect a reverse stock split,' one of
the mop up devices. This results in all shareholders receiving fractional shares. Since most states have laws which permit a corporation to unilaterally buy out fractional shares, 19 the reverse stock
split can be an effective means of removing a minority interest.

A second mop up technique following a relatively successful
tender, and one of the most often used, is the merger. If, following
the tender, a substantial minority remains in the acquired corporation, the acquiring corporation may employ the long form merger

provisions. However, if the insiders control almost all of the outstanding stock as a result of the tender, they can take advantage of
20
short form merger statutes in effect in most states.

Use of these various means of removing minority stockholders
from equity participation has been referred to pejoratively as
freezeouts2 ' or squeezeouts. 2 2 However, at least one commentator,
leaves the minority with fractional shares which the corporation can repurchase. For
example, if the controlling interest is held in large blocks of 500, the corporation offers one new share for 500 outstanding shares. The terms of the split are devised to
assure that the smaller securities holders will receive only fractional shares. The
small shareholder must then sell his fractional shares to the corporation or "round
up" by purchasing enough fractional shares to receive a whole share. Since rounding up usually involves a substantial investment, the controlling shareholder achieves
complete control of a now private entity. See Securities Act Release No. 5567, [19741975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,104, at 85,090-91 (Feb. 6, 1975);
Address by A.A. Sommer, Jr., Law Advisory Council Lecture, Notre Dame Law
School (1974) reprinted in [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

80,010.
16. In this type of takeout, the assets of the first corporation, A, are sold to a
new corporation, B, created and owned by the controlling shareholders of A. Once B
is in control of the assets of A, A is liquidated. The controlling shareholders now
operate essentially the same enterprise without interference from the minority
shareholders. See Borden, supra note 2, at 997-99.
17. See Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARv. L. REv. 297, 330 (1974); Note, Going Private, supra note 2, at 909.
18. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 155 (1974).
20. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
21. See Vorenberg, supra note 5, at 1192.
22. See Borden, supra note 2, at 988.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1978

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 4 [1978], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6: 973

recognizing the merits of various forms of going private, refers to
23
them as takeouts, a more neutral denomination.

The takeout which has spawned the most commentary is the
true going private transaction. 2 4 Many corporations involved in this

type of transaction first went public in the bull market era of the
late 1960's. Taking advantage of an inflated market, these corporations eagerly sought public participation. When market conditions
subsequently became depressed, these same corporations capi-

talized on the decrease in stock prices and repurchased all of their
outstanding publicly held stock. This provided a means of buying
their way back into private status by buying up corporate assets

more valuable than the price reflected, at very modest expense.
Though this form of transaction is often singled out as the most odious,2 5 it shares a common bond with other forms of takeouts: Once

the transaction is effected, the majority retains control and the
minority shareholders face illiquidity of their stock and a majority
26
who can dictate the terms of the takeout.

Former Securities and Exchange Commissioner Sommer
awakened public interest in these transactions when it became

evident that some corporations and persons were taking undue
advantage of the economic climate created in the early 1970's.27
23. Id. at 989.
24. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
25. Admittedly there seems something fundamentally inequitable about
such a stark progression of events and perhaps a use of the . . . statutes
should not be permitted which would allow those with controlling interests
who originally sought public participation to later kick out public investors
for the sole reason that they have outlived their utility to those in control
and are made easy pickings by existing market conditions.
Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1358 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd In
part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). See Securities Act Release No. 5884, [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,366 (Nov. 17, 1977).
26. However one looks at it, "going private" is most often a no-win situation
for public stockholders. For the buy-out price is almost always a small fraction of what the investor paid for the stock. The price, moreover, is determined by a consultant hired by the buyers. The investors have the choice of
taking what is offered or holding a stock that is no longer readily marketable.
Hershman, Going Private-OrHow to Squeeze Investors, DUN'S REV., January 1975,
at 37. As former Securities and Exchange Commissioner Sommer noted: "If [the investor] chooses to stay aboard he may find the liquidity of his investment-the ability to sell readily at a price reasonably proximate to the last sale-reduced, perhaps
completely destroyed." Address of A.A. Sommer, Jr., supra note 15. Commissioner
Sommer went on to describe the conditions during a takeout: "Faced with the prospect of a force-out merger, or a market reduced to glacial activity and the liquidity of
the Mojave Desert,... how real is the choice of the shareholder ... ?" Id. at 84,696.
27. Address of A.A. Sommer, Jr., supra note 15.
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The coercive efforts of the majority and the inherent conflict of
interest caused other critics to call for an end to the "rape of the
minority." 28 Courts, responding to increasing abuse, tried to expand the remedies available to aggrieved shareholders. Indeed, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, spurred not only by potential harm to the investor, but by the possible adverse effect on confidence in the marketplace, 2 9 has proposed strict new rules gov30
erning all forms of takeouts.
Delaware, a leading corporate home, has now taken sighificant
steps to protect minority rights by placing restrictions on future
corporate combinations. Whether Delaware will pursue this course
28. Bernstein, Fairnessand Freezeout, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 26, 1977, at 2, Col. 3.
29. As one commentator acknowledged: "I cannot imagine that the continued
flourishing of schemes through which small shareholders are squeezed out against
their will, or given an alternative between surrendering their ownership and engaging in prolonged and expensive litigation, does anything to promote confidence in
the markets." Address of A.A. Sommer, Jr., supra note 15, at 84,699.
30. The Securities and Exchange Commission has recently proposed two new
rules and accompanying schedules which would regulate going private transactions:
proposed rule 13e-3 and proposed rule 13e-4. See Securities Act Release No. 5884,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,366 (Nov. 17, 1977).
Proposed rule 13e-3 will provide definitions, specific disclosure and dissemination
requirements, and antifraud provisions for most going private transactions. Id. at
88,735. The definition of going private will extend to the identity of the person who
proposed the transaction, the type of transaction, and the likelihood of the transaction
producing certain specified results, such as delisting from a national exchange. Id at
88,744. The antifraud provisions will make going private unlawful unless the transactions are fair and not fraudulent or manipulative. Id. at 88,747. The use of the fairness standard extends the reach of the new rule beyond the purview of existing rule
10b-5 in affording relief to minority shareholders. The SEC has indicated that the
fairness of the transaction will, of course, depend on the facts and circumstances of
each case.
Since it was thought that these going private rules alone would not adequately
cover all corporate transmutations, proposed rule 13e-4 was suggested. This rule will
"provide substantive regulation and disclosure requirements with respect to tender
and exchange offers by certain issuers for their own securities." Id. at 88,735. See
also Metz, Marketplace, Proposed Rules on Going-Private Moves, N.Y. Times, Jan.
26, 1978, at D-2. In light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Santa Fe Indus.,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), these proposals have already become the center
of controversy. At a recent convention, Professor Alan R. Bromberg commented that
the Supreme Court in Santa Fe refused to establish a federal fiduciary doctrine and
override state regulation of corporations, yet the SEC's proposed rules require compliance with federal law notwithstanding compliance with the applicable state law.
See [1978] 437 SEC. REG. & L. REP (BNA) A-28 to A-29. The proposed SEC regulations represent a major expansion of federal regulation into areas of state law, while
the Supreme Court in Santa Fe sought to limit such federal interference. Professor
Bromberg, who predicted that these rules will certainly be challenged, further stated
that as long as the Supreme Court holds that going private is not a federal matter,
states will differ in their treatment of such transactions. Id.
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and provide even greater protection for the victimized minority is
unclear. Certainly, pursuit of such a course would detract from Delaware's attractiveness as a corporate home, a position it can be expected to protect. With its favorable treatment of corporate management so firmly entrenched, Delaware may soon retreat from its
position in Singer.
BACKGROUND

The Facts in Singer
In the complex area of stock mergers, the facts of Singer are
not uncommon. North American Phillips Corp. (North American),
a Delaware corporation, sought control of the Magnavox Company,
also a Delaware corporation. The takeover was accomplished by a
two-step acquisition. 3 1 North American organized North American
Development Corp. (Development) as a wholly owned subsidiary
for the sole purpose of effecting a tender offer for Magnavox
stock. 32 The initial consideration proffered by Development was
$8.00 per share. 33 Development fully disclosed North American's
intentions and advised Magnavox of the possibility of a merger or
other means to acquire the remaining shares. The Magnavox direc34
tors decided to oppose the offer and so advised their stockholders.
Negotiations between the Magnavox directors and the directors
of North American and Development followed. As a result of these
negotiations, Development raised the consideration to $9.00 per
share. Pursuant to this settlement, and at the insistence of the
managements of North American and Development, employment
contracts were entered into with sixteen officers of Magnavox. 35
Thereafter, Magnavox's compromised management withdrew its
31.

See note 12 supra and accompanying text.

32. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 971 (Del. 1977).
33. The book value of the Magnavox shares was $11.00. See Opening Brief for
Appellants at 6, Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
34. The Magnavox directors expressed disbelief at the inadequacy of the original price offered, since it was $3.00 below book value and was arrived at unilaterally
without the benefit of negotiation. However, the directors' motivation in opposing
the tender offer may be more readily attributable to their loss of job security caused

by a successful tender. See id.
35. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 971 (Del. 1977). Once their jobs
were secure, the directors decided to withdraw their oppostion to the offer. A recent

New York decision, commenting on the facts of Singer, noted that the directors of
Magnavox " 'sold-out' the minority in the tender offer battle while taking great care
to protect their own positions." Bosee v. Babcock Int'l Inc., No. 17370/77, slip op. at
9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 17, 1978).
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opposition to the tender offer, and Development succeeded in acquiring 84.1% of Magnavox's outstanding common stock. With Development's, control firmly entrenched, the two managements set
out to acquire the entire equity interest. For this purpose, Development created T.M.C. Development Corp. (T.M.C.), a wholly
owned subsidiary, for the sole purpose of merging with and into
Magnavox. 36 The success of the merger was a certainty since the
number of shares owned by Development exceeded the required
statutory majority vote. 31
The minority shareholders of Magnavox brought a class action
suit to nullify the merger on the theory that a merger effected
without a valid business purpose is fraudulent. 38 The court of chancery found the merger authorized by statute and in full compliance
with the procedural requirements of Delaware law, and dismissed
the suit. 3 9 The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the decision
below, 40 finding that compliance with legal requirements does not
insulate a merger from judicial review. 4 1 The court held that a
merger effected under the long form merger provisions of the Delaware Code42 for the sole purpose of freezing out a minority inter36. The mechanics of the merger were as follows: Development, the controlling shareholder of Magnavox, transferred its Magnavox shares to T.M.C., a wholly

owned subsidiary. The intent was to merge the public corporation, Magnavox, with
the private subsidiary, T.M.C. Under Delaware law, such a merger requires only
majority approval; with Development owning more than 84% of the outstanding
shares, the merger was a certainty. The minority shareholders were paid cash in
exchange for their shares, and the resulting merged corporation had no public ownership. After the merger was effected, Magnavox was the surviving corporation,
wholly owned by Development which in turn was wholly owned by North American.
37. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
38. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1351 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
39. Id. at 1362.
40. See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
41. Id. at 980. The Supreme Court expressed this proposition in an early case
dealing with fiduciary principles: "[A controlling shareholder] cannot use his power
for his personal advantage and to the detriment of the stockholders . . .no matter
how absolute in terms that power may be and no matter how meticulous he is to
satisfy technical requirements." Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939). The court
in Singer relied on Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971),
where the court noted that "inequitable action does not become permissible simply
because it is legally possible." Id. at 439. See Petty v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 347
A.2d 140, 143 (Del. Ch. 1975) ("[T]he fact that charter or bylaw provisions may technically permit the action contemplated does not automatically insulate directors
against scrutiny of purpose."). See also Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del.
Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (1967); Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 99 A.2d 236 (Del.
Ch. 1953).
42. Section 251 of the Delaware Code provides in pertinent part:
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est is a violation of fiduciary principles governing the relationship
between controlling and minority shareholders. 4 3
PotentialFederal Regulation
The Delaware statutes governing mergers were recently the
subject of judicial review in Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. ,'4 4
decided prior to the Singer decision. Prior to Green, an aggrieved
shareholder who believed a merger was improper could rely on
principles of fiduciary obligations and pursue a state remedy. 4 5
However, fiduciary duty lacks a clear statutory basis; this uncertainty regarding evolving state law standards impelled plaintiffs to
seek relief under federal securities law. 4 6 When Green reached the
(a) Any 2 or more corporations existing under the laws of this State may
merge into a single corporation, which may be any 1 of the constituent corporations or may consolidate into a new corporation formed by the consolidation, pursuant to an agreement of merger or consolidation, as the case may
be, complying and approved in accordance with this section.
(b) The board of directors of each corporation which desires to merge or
consolidate shall adopt a resolution approving an agreement of merger or
consolidation. The agreement shall state: . . . (4) the manner of converting
the shares of each of the constituent corporations into shares or other securities of the corporation surviving or resulting from the merger or consolidation and, if any shares of any of the constituent corporations are not to be
converted solely into shares or other securities of the surviving or resulting
corporation, the cash, property, rights or securities of any other corporation
which the holders of such shares are to receive in exchange for, or upon
conversion of such shares and the surrender of the certificates evidencing
them, which cash, property, rights or securities of any other corporation may
be in addition to or in lieu of shares or other securities of the surviving or
resulting corporation....
(c) The agreement required by subsection (b) of this section shall be
submitted to the stockholders of each constituent corporation at an annual or
special meeting for the purpose of acting on the agreement. Due notice of
the time, place and purpose of the meeting shall be mailed to each holder of
stock, whether voting or nonvoting, of the corporation at his address as it
appears on the records of the corporation, at least 20 days prior to the date of
the meeting. At the meeting, the agreement shall be considered and a vote
taken for its adoption or rejection. If a majority of the outstanding stock of
the corporation entitled to vote thereon shall be voted for the adoption of
the agreement, that fact shall be certified on the agreement by the secretary
or assistant secretary of the corporation.
DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
43. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977).
44. 430 U.S. 462 (1977), rev'g 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976).
45. See Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1286, 1297 n.4 (2d Cir.
1976) (Mansfield, J., concurring), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
46. Plaintiffs sought relief under Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977). See
Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1288 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S.
462 (1977); Sherrard, Fiduciariesand Fairness Under Rule 10b-5, 29 VAND. L. REV.
1385, 1402 (1976).
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Second Circuit, the court held that the majority breached its
fiduciary obligation by effecting a merger absent a justifiable business purpose. 47 Those who have long inveighed against the permissive, management-oriented standards accepted by the states welcomed this decision. 48 Yet while the decision appeared to be a
major victory for proponents of minority rights, it was not longlived. The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's decision, 49 holding that federal law was the wrong remedy for prob-

47. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1291 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd,
430 U.S. 462 (1977). In Green plaintiff sought to enjoin a merger between a parent
corporation and its subsidiary by invoking rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977),
the antifraud provision of federal securities law. The merger was to be effected pursuant to the short form merger provisions of Delaware law, the salient feature of
which is that a majority of 90% of the shareholders can eliminate the 10% minority
without any vote of the shareholders. The plaintiffs alleged that the merger was
fraudulent, since the insiders attempted to acquire complete control at a grossly undervalued price. Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful "[rio engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Id. Finding that the
rule is to be broadly construed, the court in Green stated:
When controlling shareholders of a publicly held corporation use corporate
funds to force extinction of the minority shareholders' interest for the sole
purpose of feeding the pocketbooks of the controlling shareholders, such
conduct goes beyond mere negligent mismanagement and is properly cognizable as "an act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud."
Green v. Santa Fe. Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1290 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting rule
10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977)), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). Though Green involved the use of a short form merger, long form mergers raise many of the same policy questions. Indeed, the Delaware court of chancery has recently stated that the
duty to scrutinize a merger for fairness, established in Singer, extends to short form
mergers as well. Kemp v. Angel, 381 A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1977). Thus, it seemed that
the court in Green has opened a new avenue of relief for shareholders once relegated to appraisal. For a detailed discussion of Green, see Banoff, FraudWithout Deceit: Marshel v. AFW Fabrics Corp. and Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc., 17 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1 (1977); Rosenfeld, An Essay in Support of the Second Circuit's
Decisions in Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp. and Green v. Santa Fe Industries, 5
HOFSTRA L. REv. 111 (1976); Note, The Second Circuit Adopts a Business Purpose
Test for Going Private: Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp. and Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc., 64 CALIF. L. REv. 1184 (1976).
48. See, e.g., Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
49. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). See also Wright v.
Heizer Corp., 460 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3400
(U.S. Dec. 7, 1977) (No. 77-814) (U.S. Supreme Court asked to clarify issue of
whether deception prohibited by rule 10b-5 can be determined solely from breach of
fiduciary duty actionable under state law); Biesenbach v. Guenther, [1978] 442 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 1978) (district court ruled that, standing
alone, allegations that directors violated their fiduciary duties does not state cause of
action under rule 10b-5 in light of Supreme Court's decision in Green).
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lems of internal mismanagement. 50 Perhaps the Court was concerned that procedural attractions alone would induce plaintiffs to
pursue federal rather than state relief; or, the Court might have
been influenced by a recognition that state law contains adequate
but under-utilized legal principles to deal with such problems.
Nevertheless, the Court declined the role of "lord high adjudicator" 5 1 on the question of the propriety of takeouts and
placed the responsibility on the states: " 'Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate
directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to
stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation.' "52
Possibly this call upon the states to aggressively provide adequate protection for victimized minorities motivated the court in
Singer to depart from the longstanding permissive attitude towards
takeouts.
THE BUSINESS PURPOSE TEST

The defendants in Singer effected a merger pursuant to section
251, the long form merger provision, which expressly provides that
"[a]ny 2 or more corporations existing under the laws of this State
may merge into a single corporation." '53 The statute also details the
appropriate procedure and the consideration shareholders may receive in exchange for their stock. 54 However, the statute is silent
as to any requirement of a business purpose to justify the merger.
It seemed that the legislature had balanced the rights of the major50.

Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977). In narrowly inter-

preting rule 10b-5 to preclude challenging a merger's fairness as long as management
made full disclosure, the Supreme Court removed "'a major stumbling block to
going private.'" Phalon, supra note 2, at 28, col. 2 (quoting Arthur Rosenbloom, se-

nior vice president of Standard Research Consultants).
51. Borden, Some Comments on Singer v. Magnavox, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 4, 1977, at
1, col. 2.
52. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (quoting Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975)) (emphasis in original).
53. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
54. Id. Before 1967, Delaware required that shares of each constituent corporation in the merger be convertible only into securities of the surviving corporation.
Cash was only permitted to be used for fractional shares. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251
(1953). However, in 1967, the statute was amended to permit cash to be issued for

shares of the merged corporation. An Act to Amend Chapter 1 of Title 8 of the Delaware Code, Entitled "General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware," 56 Del.
Laws 151 (to be codified at DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251(b)(4) (Supp. 1977)).
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ity and the minority. 55 Judge Moore endorsed this position in his
dissent to the Second Circuit opinion in Green, noting:
Delaware law does not require that the merger be pursuant to
any corporate purpose more limited than the general corporate
purposes contained in the corporate charter, which set the
boundaries beyond which the corporation will be said to act ultra
vires. The short form merger statute is not a procedure designed
to effect certain business outcomes; it is the articulation of certain substantive rights ....

56

The court of chancery's decision in Singer accords with this view of
the merger statute. Relying on prior cases, 57 and on longstanding
legislative approval and encouragement of mergers, 58 the court
stated that "as a general principle Delaware courts will not inquire
into the reasons motivating a merger or the business justification
for it as a part of determining its validity." 59 In short, the court
seemed to acknowledge that the statute means what it says. Noting
this discussion by the lower court, the Supreme Court of Delaware
55. By enacting merger statutes, the legislature expressly recognized that once
the percentage of minority shareholders becomes sufficiently small, the majority
should be permitted to eliminate them, subject always to the minority's right to receive fair value in an appraisal. E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION
LAW § 251 (1972).

56. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1304.(2d Cir. 1976) (Moore,
J., dissenting) (emphasis in original), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). In reversing, the
Supreme Court noted that since Delaware does not require a business purpose to
justify a merger, interpreting rule 10b-5 to require one would impose a stricter
fiduciary standard than that required by the state. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462, 479 (1977).
57. See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1355 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). In Federal United Corp. v. Havender,
24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331 (1940), the Supreme Court of Delaware noted that
mergers are encouraged to the extent that they conserve and promote corporate interests. Id. at 334, 11 A.2d at 338. In MacCrone v. American Capital Corp., 51 F.
Supp. 462 (D. Del. 1943), the court held that reasons for a merger are not matters for
judicial determination since the merger "is an act of independent legal significance."
Id. at 469 (footnote omitted). In Bruce v. E. L. Bruce Co., 40 Del. Ch. 80, 174 A.2d
29 (1961), the court stated that "it is the policy of the courts of Delaware to permit
contracting corporations to take advantage of statutory devices for corporate consolidation .... ." Id. at 82, 174 A.2d at 30. See also Bastian v. Bourns Inc., 256 A.2d 680,
684 (Del. Ch. 1969), aff'd, 278 A.2d 467 (Del. 1970), where the court commented
that the 1967 revisions of the merger statutes reflect continuing legislative approval
of mergers and avoidance of their disruption by protesting shareholders.
58. DEL. CODE tit. 8, §§ 251, 253 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977). See Bastian v.
Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680, 684 (Del. Ch. 1969), aff'd, 278 A.2d 467 (Del. 1970). See
also E. FOLK, supra note 55, at 318, 332.
59. Singer v. Magnavox, Inc., 367 A.2d 1349, 1355 (Del. Ch. 1976), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
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in Singer began its discussion by focusing on the merits of importing a business purpose requirement into the merger provisions as
a limitation on the majority's power to compel a merger.
Vested Shareholder'sRights
Imposition of such a limitation is not novel. This circumscription reflects the now dated concept of vested shareholder's rights,
which recognized the shareholder's continuing property interest in
the corporation. 60 The once prevailing doctrine required that affixing the label "vested right" to a shareholder's equity position
barred any majority action which might injure that interest. 6 '
However, a recent commentary has recognized this concept as a
"hopeless anachronism" 6 2 in today's corporate society, in which tax
laws, corporate laws, and securities laws perpetuate a variety of
corporate permutations. The demise of this relic was noted in
Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette, Inc. :63 "It is clear that
the Delaware legislature has determined that a stockholder has no
absolute right to his interest in the corporation and may be forced
to surrender his shares for a fair cash price." 64 As long as the

shareholder is compensated for what he is asked to relinquish, "he
has no constitutionally protected right to continue as a stockholder." 65 Yet the term freezeout, connoting wrongful exclusion, persisted in courts' discussions of minority interests. Still concerned
about the dilution of basic shareholder rights in the name of cor60. See Vorenberg, supra note 5. See also Bove v. Community Hotel Corp., 105
R.I. 36, 44 & n. 4 , 249 A.2d 89, 94 & n.4 (1969).
61. See Outwater v. Public Service Corp., 103 N.J. Eq. 461, 143 A. 729 (1928),
affd, 104 N.J. Eq. 490, 146 A. 916 (1929): "Continued membership, until dissolution,
is an inherent property right in corporate existence." Id. at 466, 143 A. at 731.
62. Borden, supra note 2, at 1016. Professor Manning has suggested that discussion of vested shareholders rights is little more than "platonic muck." Manning,
The Shareholder'sAppraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223,
245 (1962). This opinion has also been expressed by the New York courts: "In short,
the merged corporation's shareholder has only one real right; to have the value of his
holding protected, and that protection is given him by his right to an appraisal . ..."
Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 11, 19, 87 N.E.2d 561, 564 (1949) (citation omitted). See also Willcox v. Stem, 18 N.Y.2d 195, 202, 219 N.E.2d 401, 404, 273
N.Y.S.2d 38, 43 (1966). Another representative comment is that "changes have occurred in class shareholder rights, and the old words of 'vested rights' now seem equally
out of fashion. Such rights are now 'fixed' only in the sense that they continue until
changed by the vote of a specified majority." Gibson, How Fixed are Class
ShareholderRights?, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 283, 283 (1958).

63. 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla. 1974) (citations omitted), aff'd, 521 F.2d 812
(5th Cir. 1975).
64. Id. at 1403.
65. Willcox v. Stem, 18 N.Y.2d 195, 202, 219 N.E.2d 401, 404, 273 N.Y.S.2d 38,
43 (1966).
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porate flexibility, various courts posited another limitation to support their disapproval of displacing the minority: the business purpose test.
The threshold policy determination in considering the viability
of any corporate combination is whether the majority should ever
be permitted to force the minority to take cash for their interest

while the majority retains control of the assets of the enterprise.
This question must be answered affirmatively; state legislatures

have steadily adjusted corporate statutes to respond to the requirements of business and commercial growth, thereby facilitating

mergers. 66 Indeed, Delaware has exemplified legislative deference

to corporate need. 6 7 However, once it was determined that the
need for corporate flexibility had overshadowed the importance of
protecting minority shareholder interests, at least some states ques-

tioned this deference. 6s The notion emerged that some limits must
remain on the majority's power, because even meticulous compliance with statutory procedure could still be a device for unfair
dealing. 69 Professor Vorenberg gave currency to the business purpose test by suggesting that assertion of a plausible business objective, before forcing the minority shareholders to surrender their
interest, appeared to make the transaction less repugnant.7 0 This
view has been advocated by the academic community and followed
and articulated in decisions of the Delaware courts and of other state

and federal courts. 71

66. See generally, Greene, supra note 2.
67. As one commentator has noted:
Corporations like the Delaware law for a number of reasons. It is called
a model of clarity and so thorough that a question rarely arises that cannot

be resolved in advance. Thus a corporate manager can make decisions with
an eye on the Delaware statute and be fairly sure that he will avoid challenge.
... As one student of the state's corporate law put it: "They have always
spotted new problems and have revised the law to meet them."
Metz, Marketplace Fairnessto Minority in Mergers, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1977, at 52,
col 4.
68. See, e.g., Tanzer Economic Assocs., Inc. v. Universal Food Specialities, Inc.,
87 Misc. 2d 167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Securities Act Release No. 5567,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 80,104, at 85,091 (Feb. 6,
1975).
69. See Tanzer Economic Assocs., Inc. v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc., 87
Misc. 2d 167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
70. Vorenberg, supra note 5, at 1204.
71. Id. Compare Borden, supra note 2, at 996, 1037-38 with Vorenberg, supra
note 5, at 1204. See also Albright v. Bergendahl, 391 F. Supp. 754 (D. Utah 1974).
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The Test Without a Definable Standard
One of the most cited cases for the proposition that the majority's power to effect a merger must be qualified by requiring
a valid business purpose is Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co. 72 Distin-

guishable from Singer, Bryan involved the controlling shareholders
of a private corporation, who, after several attempts to buy out a
minority shareholder, transferred their shares to a shell corporation
organized solely to effect a merger and thereby remove the dissident minority. 73 The majority merged the existing corporation with
the privately owned shell corporation and cashed out the minority
interest. The court held that absent a valid business purpose, the
transaction was a sham used "to circumvent the rule of law that
prohibits a majority ... [from forcing] the minority interests to sur-

render their stock holdings." 74 Though Bryan involved a true going
private transaction, the court made no effort to limit its holding to
such transactions and did not elucidate which reasons a corporation might advance as justifiable corporate purposes.
Similarly, in Jutkowitz v. Bourns,75 a California court, obvi72. 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974). See also Polin v.
Conductron Corp., 552 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1977).
73. Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563, 568-69 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 844 (1974).
74. Id. at 570. In Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, 342 A.2d
566 (1975), a New Jersey court faced with facts similar to those in Bryan did not
unequivocally adopt the business purpose test: "While the Bryan approach is tempting to follow, it is unnecessary at this time to rule that the lack of a valid business
purpose is sufficient to prevent a merger which otherwise complies with our Business Corporation Act." Id. at 48, 342 A.2d at 573. However, Bryan was distinguished
in Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla. 1974),
affd, 521 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1975). In Grimes the court acknowledged that Bryan
was simply a paper transaction. Id. at 1402. Since the shell corporation had no corporate existence prior to its formation for the purpose of the merger, the merger could
have no effect on the business of the corporation. Unlike Bryan, Grimes involved the
combination of two businesses in which the elimination of potential conflicts of interest and the realization of future savings upon the merger of two similar businesses
was found to justify the merger. Id. Notwithstanding the freezeout of the minority,
these justifications were recognized as valid business purposes: "While plaintiff may
not care to see this happen, since there is no evidence of fraud or over-reaching he is
not entitled to enjoin the merger." Id. at 1404 (citations omitted).
75. No. CA 000268 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 1975). In Jutkowitz, plaintiff
brought a class action on behalf of all minority shareholders seeking to prevent the
merger of Bourns, Inc., into Bourns Newco. Id., slip op. at 1. The Bourns family, owners of 90% of Bourns, Inc., caused the creation of Newco, a shell corporation, to which
they transferred their Bourns, Inc., shares. Newco was then to be mergered into
Bourns, Inc., with the minority holders of Bourns, Inc., to be cashed out at $10.00 per
share. Id., slip op. at 2. The defendants, the Bourns family, explicitly stated that their
sole purpose in going private was to eliminate the minority. Id. They contended that
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ously incensed at what it considered a plan of merger akin to "private condemnation," 76 held that a business purpose is required and
that elimination of the minority in and of itself is clearly not a
proper purpose. In condemning the use of takeouts, such courts
appear to have reacted emotionally, with a predisposition to decide
in favor of a perceived injured minority. 77 As one court noted:
The claim of "freeze-out" by a predatory majority using their
power as insiders to mulct corporate funds . . . and to unjustly
enrich themselves tends to lead a sympathetic court to look indulgently upon extra-statutory remedies.
The obverse of the minority claim, however, may well be
that an obdurate and obstructionist minority is engaged in a
"hold-up" of legitimate majority desires, motivated solely by
greed for the top dollar obtainable. The crime of "self-interest" is
78
always attributable to the other side.
Viewing going private transactions with disfavor, these courts have
made little effort to analyze the competing interests involved, the
values to be protected, or the feasibility of requiring a business
purpose in various transmutations of the true going private transaction. Requiring a business purpose, they have refused to uphold
business procedures which have long received legislative sanction.
New York Speaks out on Going Private
Delaware has long shared with New York the status of leading
corporate home. Indeed, some of Delaware's statutes are modeled
this was a justifiable corporate purpose in light of the advantages which nonpublic
corporations have "in this era of expensive accountability to minority shareholders
and burdensome regulation of publicly held companies." Id. The court refused to
accept this contention as a valid business purpose. If a merger is for the combination
of two businesses, the court reasoned, since Newco was created solely for the merger, there could be no statutory merger "in any realistic sense." Id., slip op. at 5.
76. Id., slip op. at 2.
77. "Although 'going private' is a legitimate corporate procedure . . . it is a
transaction fraught with legal implications .... Thus [going private] has engendered
a considerable amount of controversy and emotional comment, largely because it is
perceived as inequitable to minority shareholders and threatening to the national
economy." 49 TEMP. L.Q. 444, 444 n.3 (1976) (citations omitted). Former SEC Commissioner Sommer, commenting on going private, opined: "What is happening is, in
my estimation, serious, unfair, and sometimes disgraceful, a perversion of the whole
process of public financing, and a course that inevitably is going to make the individual shareholder even more hostile to American corporate mores and the securities
markets than he already is." Address of A.A. Sommer, Jr., supra note 15, at 84,695.
78. Tanzer Economic Assocs., Inc. v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc., 87 Misc.
2d 167, 175, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472, 478-79 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (footnote omitted).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1978

17

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 4 [1978], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6: 973

after those of New York. 7 9 An examination of how New York has
balanced corporate flexibility with protection of the minority is useful in predicting Delaware's approach towards going private.
New York's Business Corporation Law expressly authorizes
two domestic corporations to merge upon the approval of twothirds of the shareholders of each constituent corporation.8 0 As protection for the minority against unfair merger terms, the legislature
has also provided a means for the minority to challenge the consideration offered them in the merger.81 A dissatisfied shareholder
may commence an appraisal proceeding to have the court determine the fair value of his shares. Until recently, it appeared to be
well-settled that, given compliance with statutory requirements,
appraisal was the exclusive remedy for a minority shareholder,
2
even if there were a freezeout.
The exclusivity of the appraisal remedy was reaffirmed in
Willcox v. Stern.8 3 In Willcox the court noted: "So long as the
value of petitioner's interest is compensable, he has no constitutionally protected right to continue as a stockholder."8 4 Yet the
court added a caveat that, where there is fraud or illegality, equity
will intervene despite the existence of an appraisal remedy.8 5 Presumably, the caveat was only a "warning footnote to curb predatory
appetites," 8 6 since public policy would permit corporate takeovers
by an entity overwhelmingly in control regardless of minority
'87
claims of "squeeze out," "freeze out" or "Push out.
The early 1970's brought depressed market conditions and an
economic climate conducive to control groups buying up publicly
held shares. Going private transactions increased and minority
shareholders were squeezed out of their equity positions. Going
79. See E. Folk, supra note 55, at 351.
80. N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 903(a)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978).

81. Id. §§ 623, 910.
82. In Beloffv. Consolidated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.2d 561 (1949), the
court commented that "the merged corporation's shareholder has only one real right;
to have the value of his holding protected, and that protection is given him by his
right to an appraisal." Id. at 19, 87 N.E.2d at 564 (citation omitted). See also Vine v.
Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967); Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Bade, 37
N.Y.2d 585, 590, 338 N.E.2d 614, 617, 376 N.Y.S.2d 103, 108 (1975); Anderson v.
International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 295 N.Y. 343, 67 N.E.2d 573 (1946).
83. 18 N.Y.2d 195, 219 N.E.2d 401, 273 N.Y.S.2d 38 (1966).
84. Id. at 202, 219 N.E.2d at 404, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
85. Id. at 205, 219 N.E.2d at 405, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
86. Tanzer Economic Assocs., Inc. v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc., 87 Misc.

2d 167, 172, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472, 477 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
87.

Id.
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private mergers were completely in accord with statutory requirements: There was no illegality to justify judicial interference. 8 8 The
courts responded by expanding the remedies available to the aggrieved shareholder. Indeed, a new rule appeared to be emerging
in New York: Absent a clear showing of a proper business purpose,
judicial intervention in a merger is justified, despite the existence
of an appraisal remedy.
In People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc.,89 the court enjoined a
merger which had no palpable corporate purpose. Until 1968, Concord Fabrics, Inc. (Concord) had been a private family-controlled
company. However, determined to capitalize on inflated market
conditions, the controlling family decided to take the company public by selling 32% of its interest in the corporation to the public at
$15 and $20 per share. 90 The insiders retained 68% of the stock. As
market conditions eroded, defendants began tendering for the publicly held shares at prices far below the original price at which the
public had been lured into the company. When the tender route
became impractical, the insiders attempted a merger. By 1974, the
stock of Concord had fallen to $1.00 per share. In what was becoming a typical scenario, the insiders then placed their 68% stock
ownership into a private corporation created solely to effect a merger with Concord and cash out the minority shareholders. The insiders therefore, attempted to acquire 100% control for $1,500,000
after having exploited the public for approximately $8,500,000.91
The merger was enjoined, and the court, outraged by these
events, noted: "Adding to the odium of the scheme is that [sic] fact
that no real corporate purpose has been demonstrated ....
92 Af
ter Concord it appeared that the expressly sanctioned power to
merge was to be qualified by the requirement of a valid business
88. See Blumenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel, Inc., 202 Misc. 988, 115 N.Y.S.2d 52
(Sup. Ct. 1952). Seeking to eliminate minority shareholders does not raise an issue of
illegality. Id. at 993, 115 N.Y.S.2d at 57.
89. 83 Misc. 2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 50 App. Div. 2d 787,
377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1st Dept. 1975).
90. When the company first went public, it sold 500,000 shares. The insiders
were able to obtain needed capital while still retaining a controlling interest in the
company. Id. at 121, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
91. The insiders offered the minority $3.00 per share based on an appraisal the
independent basis of which was questioned. Id.
92. Id. at 125, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 554. The proxy statement stated that the purpose
of the merger was to return control of the corporation to the family so they could
determine all corporate policies "without public scrutiny and solely with regard to
their own interests." Id. at 122, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
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purpose. 93 Echoes of minority rule were returning to corporation

law, and corporate flexibility seemed in jeopardy.
Subsequent decisions, however, limited Concord and recognized distinctions between the various kinds of going private transactions. Tanzer Economic Associates, Inc. v. Universal Food
Specialties, Inc. 94 involved the merger of two substantial corpora-

tions which effectively eliminated the public holdings in the acquired corporation and vested complete control in the acquiring
corportion. Recognizing the express legislative sanction of mergers,
the court refused to upset such procedures based on emotional
claims of "freeze-out" or "squeeze-out." 95 Whether to impose an
additional requirement on the merger process "must be decided on
90
the facts of each case and not on the ready application of labels."
By distinguishing Concord as involving manipulation by an inside
group "which sold the stock high in 'going public' and repurchased
it low to its [own] benefit,"97 the court apparently limited Concord
to such facts. The court in Tanzer recognized other business purposes inherent in the combination of two operating businesses. 9 8
This broad spectrum of justifiable corporate purposes would seem
to permit most combinations while outlawing only those which are
manifestly naked grabs for power and egregiously unfair to the
minority.
93. See SEC v. Farklane Hosiery Co., 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977); Clark v.
Pattern Analysis & Recognition Corp., 87 Misc. 2d 385, 384 N.Y.S.2d 660 (Sup. Ct.
1976).
94. 87 Misc. 2d 167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976). See also Schulwolf v.
Cerro Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 292, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
95. Tanzer Economic Assocs., Inc. v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc., 87
Misc. 2d 167, 175, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472, 478-79 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
96. Id., 383 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
97. Id. at 177, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
98. Id. at 182, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 483. Some of these business purposes recognized
by the court were:
(1) improved management and corporate planning... ; (2) existing management experience
will be mutually available; (3) savings will result from
economies in centralized procurement of raw materials; (4) there will be
marketing economy in joint distribution, warehousing and advertising; (5)
duplication of departments and personnel can be avoided; (6) a greater diversity of products would result in the evening out of cyclical demand; (7)
both companies will be in a stronger financial position .

.

. ; (8) .

.

. there

will be no concern about possible conflicts of interest ... ; and (9) without
public shareholders the company would not be subject to charges of overreaching or unfairness to the minority, and would eliminate all the time,
expense and energy incurred in connection with . . . dividends, proxy

notices, annual reports, SEC compliance and the attendant legal problems.
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This reliberalization of New York law governing corporate
combinations was affirmed recently in Bosee v. Babcock International, Inc. 99 On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action, the court held that in a merger situation, absent a clear
showing of "extraordinary circumstances," appraisal is the exclusive
remedy for a dissenting shareholder.' 0 0 The plaintiff in Bosee was a
minority shareholder in American Chain & Cable Co. (ACCO), a
New York corporation. Babcock International, Inc. (BII), a Delaware corporation, wanted to acquire complete control of ACCO.
Through a successful tender offer, BII acquired almost 97% of ACCO's outstanding shares. Thereafter, BII created Newco Industries
Corp. in New York, as a wholly owned subsidiary of BII, to merge
with and into ACCO pursuant to the New York merger provisions.
The merger plan provided that upon approval of the merger each
share of ACCO held by shareholders other than BII would be canceled with the shareholders receiving cash in exchange for their
shares.' 0 ' As a result, plaintiffs' equity position in ACCO was
cashed out. Plaintiffs, relying mainly on Concord and the newly
decided Singer decision, challenged the merger alleging that it
served no business purpose.
Rejecting plaintiff's assertion that the emerging law in New
York required a valid business purpose, the court held that both
Singer and Concord involved exceptional circumstances not present
in Bosee.' 0 2 The Court in Bosee noted that in Singer there was clear
evidence that the directors and officers were selling out the minority in the tender offer battle "while taking great care to protect
their own positions."'10 3 The court held that, absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances, judicial intervention is not warranted
in a merger situation.
Application of a standard which permits a court to determine a
merger's validity on a case-by-case basis indicates New York's retreat from the prominority position in Concord. New York appears

99. No. 17370177 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 17, 1978). See also Cole v. Schenley Indus., Inc. 563 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1977); Tanzer Economic Assocs., Inc. v. Masoneilan
Int'l, Inc., N.Y.L.J., May 26, 1977, at 7, col. 15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 25, 1977); Cross
v. Communications Channels, Inc., N.Y.L.J., July 6, 1977, at 6, col. 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
July 5, 1977).
100. Bosee v. Babcock Int'l, Inc., No. 17370177, slip op. at 8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb.
17, 1978).
101. Id. at 4.
102. Id. at 9.
103. Id.
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to have tipped the balance in favor of corporate management. One
can fairly assume that the business purpose test will be resurrected
in New York only to outlaw blatant grabs for power in which judicial intervention is necessary to prevent the "rape" of the minority.
Having thus preserved its status as a corporate home, New York has
come full circle from its decision in Willcox: The minority is again
relegated to seeking an appraisal, unless it can establish a fraudulent transaction or extraordinary circumstances, both of which are
difficult to prove.
Delaware and the Business Purpose Test:
A Departurefrom Precedent
Though the requirement of a business purpose was a question
of first impression in Singer, two unreported decisions of the court
of chancery had addressed the issue. Until recently, it was wellaccepted in Delaware, as in New York, that where all statutory
requirements were met, appraisal was the exclusive remedy available to a dissenting shareholder. 10 4 Yet in Pennsylvania Mutual
Fund, Inc. v. Todhunter International, Inc.,105 plaintiffs sought a
temporary restraining order against effectuation of a merger on the
theory that the only purpose was an unlawful freezeout. 10 6 The
court granted the order, noting:
This is probably or possibly not a case in which a dissenting
stockholder is merely entitled to an appraisal because of his unwillingness to continue in a changed business. Here there is to
be no change in the business but merely an elimination of unwanted minority stockholders.
I feel therefore, that there is some possibility on further argument . . . of a showing of illegality . . . by reason of it being a
possible manipulation of corporate control for private purposes
with no proper business purpose in mind.10 7
104. Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (1962) (appraisal is exclusive remedy in absence of showing of fraud); David J. Greene & Co.
v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971) (if no fraud or blatant overreaching is demonstrated, plaintiffs' only recourse is to appraisal proceeding); Cole v.
National Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 156 A. 183 (1931) (discussing rights of
creditors to enjoin merger, court stated that exercise of statutory right to merge is
subject to nullification only for fraud).
105. C.A. No. 4845 (Del. Ch. Aug. 5, 1975).
106. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 975 (Del. 1977) (discussing Pennsylvania Mut. Fund, Inc. v. Todhunter Int'l, Inc., C.A. No. 4845 (Del. Ch. Aug. 5,
1975)).
107. Id. at 975 n.5.
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In Tanzer v. International General Industries, Inc., 0 8 the
court also alluded to a requirement of a business purpose: "It should
be noted . . . that IGI [the acquiring corporation] had a legitimate
and present and compelling business reason . . . IGI is not freezing out the minority just for the purpose of freezing out the minority."' 0 9 The lower court in Singer acknowledged this precedent but
noted that if it is the true going private transaction that is to be
outlawed, and if such an exception to the merger statute is to be
made, the facts of Singer do not present such an opportunity. 110
The Supreme Court of Delaware's concern in Singer with the
business purpose test seems to raise more questions than it answers. The court grappled with the two unanswered questions
raised by such a test: whose purpose and whose business? The first
enigma is that if it is the business purpose of the subsidiary that is
to be advanced by the merger, the result may be viewed as
academic, since its shareholders have been cashed out. Analysis
along these lines would justify the merger, and since such reasoning would be useless in protecting minority rights, the court in
Singer did not fully consider it. On the other hand, the court posited that if one looks to the parent's business purpose as justification for the merger, the minority shareholders of the subsidiary
"may have undue difficulty in raising and maintaining the issue."1 1' 1
If the court's analysis had proceeded along these lines, it would be
little consolation for shareholders of the subsidiary that their elimination has benefited the combined corporation out of which they
were forced. Finding itself enmeshed in a seemingly irresolvable
dilemma, the court left these questions unanswered.
Though the court professed the inutility of the business purpose test for determining if the merger is valid, its holding rests on
a finding of such a purpose. Yet, other than a facile assertion that
such a requirement is a prerequisite to a valid merger, the court
does not indicate what constitutes a valid business purpose. Indeed, the same court, in a case decided less than one month after
Singer, acknowledged the inadequacies of the term "business purpose" and suggested that such a test is ambiguous, at best, and, at

108. C.A. No. 4945 (Del. Ch. Dec. 23, 1975).
109. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 975-76 n.5 (Del. 1977) (discussing Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., C.A. No. 4945 (Del. Ch. Dec. 23, 1975)).
110. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1358 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
111. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976 (Del. 1977).
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worst, "states a result and not a right or duty." 1 12 Importation of
such a requirement into Delaware corporate law departed from
precedent, and the court's decision, so lacking in definition of what
constitutes business purpose, was inadequate.
Freezeouts: The Competing Interests

The court has correctly focused the threshold determination.
We must question whose purpose or business the merger is to advance. Though at common law a merger could not be effected

without unanimous approval of the shareholders, 1 13 the legislatures
soon recognized the need to eliminate this power of absolute
veto. 114 Once we recognize this need for corporate flexibility, the

questions should answer themselves.
By permitting various corporate permutations, the needs of
the corporation or controlling interest are protected. It is, therefore, the minority interests which require protection, since it is the

minority which is being "victimized." The minority's interest or
business purpose is not difficult to ascertain. Few shareholders
would disagree with the notion that their investment motives are
assured liquidity of their stock and appreciation of their investment. Stated bluntly, their interest is monetary."15 Therefore, if
112. Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1123 (Del. 1977).
113. See, e.g., Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6 (1941);
Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 343 A.2d 629, 634 (Del. Ch.
1975). The statutory right of appraisal is given to the shareholder as compensation for
the abrogation of the common law rule that a single shareholder could veto a merger.
114. DEL. CODE tit. 8, §§ 251, 253 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977). See Francis I.
duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 343 A.2d 629, 634 (Del. Ch. 1975).
115. Whether the shareholder's interest is in the "value" of his stock as opposed to the "form" of his investment has long been a subject of controversy. See
Vorenberg, supra note 5, at 1203-04. Though the modern view appears to recognize
the value over the form, some courts persist in relying on older notions of vested
shareholder's rights: "Money now may well satisfy some or most minority stockholders, but others have differing investment goals ... or even a sentimental attachment
to the stock which leads them to have a different judgment as to the desirability of
selling out." Jutkowitz v. Bourns, Inc., CA No. 000268, slip op. at 4 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Nov. 19, 1975). However, former SEC Commissioner Sommer noted that, when a
company goes public,
[Ult acquires a new "family" consisting of people who, overwhelmingly,
have no ties with the corporation other than their shareholdings, which they
acquire with the hope that they will be a means of profit: appreciation, dividends, a combination.
One of the things a stock purchaser in a corporations [sic] wants is
liquidity-that is, the assurance that when he wants to sell there will be a
reasonable market for the stock.
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the merger advances the monetary interests of minority shareholders, it should be permitted without the need for a showing of
further justification. Recognition of a monetary interest would permit the court to remedy the problem on a practical level and would
obviate the necessity for ad hoc determinations of business purpose and the resultant uncertainty in future corporate combinations.
For the corporation seeking to go private, there is a wide

spectrum of benefits:
Freedom from worry about the impact of corporate decisions on
stock prices; ability to take greater business risks than those
sanctioned by federal securities agencies; a switch to more conservative accounting, resulting in lower taxes; [and] the savings
which result from no longer having to prepare, print and issue
the myriad of documents required under federal and state disclosure laws .... "116
When a public parent eliminates a minority interest in a publicly
held subsidiary, there are also economies of operation and more
efficient allocation of management and professional and other costs
and expenses.
The judicial response to these benefits inuring to the corporation has not been favorable. Especially in the true going private
transaction, the courts refuse to recognize savings of costs resulting
from compliance with securities regulations as a justifiable business
purpose. 1117 Nor will the courts recognize that some corporations
are not suited for public life. 118 As one executive has noted, being
Address of A.A. Sommer, Jr., supra note 15, at 84,695. Professor Alan Bromberg, at a
recent meeting of lawyers to discuss the issue of going private, commented that the
"critical aspect" of a going private transaction is the fairness of the price paid to the

minority shareholders. See [1978] 437 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-28.
116. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1308 (2d Cir. 1976) (Moore,
J., dissenting), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
117. See Jutkowitz v. Bourns, CA No. 000268, slip op. at 6 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov.
19, 1975). It is generally agreed that one of the broad objectives of going private is to
avoid the expense and bother of compliance with the myriad disclosure and dissemination requirements imposed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, see 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(a), 78o(d) (1970). If a corporation is able to reduce sufficiently the number of
its shareholders, it can remove its shares from registration with the SEC. For a publicly held corporation, such a reduction is to less than 300 shareholders. Id. §
78 1(g)(4). Former SEC Commissioner Sommer noted that though he could foresee
business considerations which would justify reducing liquidity or even forcing a
shareholder to relinquish his equity position, he "would not include among these
avoiding the cost and bother of SEC compliance and shareholder servicing." Address
of A.A. Sommer, Jr., supra note 15, at 84,699. See also Note, Going Private, supra
note 2, at 904.
118. See Borden, supra note 2, at 1007.
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public makes life difficult. 1 19 The majority holdings in a corporation
usually represent a long term investment; conversely, the minority's interest is characteristically short term. These two seemingly
inconsistent interests impinge on the same investment, creating
conflict. There is a "fundamental incompatability . . . between
prudent management and the constraints imposed by public ownership."' 120 Avoiding these conflicts certainly appears to constitute a valid business purpose. Courts, however, seem offended
by what they perceive to be purely selfish motives. But as one commentator notes:
The selfish motivation is often adverted to in connection
with going private, but one wonders why that should be. Are
only those corporate transactions to be favored which are not
motivated by greed? Must we seek to do public good in order to
avoid regulatory sanctions? The questions answer themselves. To

observe that greed is a compelling motivation is merely to observe that we live in a free-enterprise society. 2 '
In sum, though the investment interests of the controlling group
seem different from those of the minority, both groups are selfishly concerned with protecting the value of their investments;
neither group should be impeded because it is motivated by
greed. Once we accept the interest of the shareholder as primarily monetary, it is difficult to understand what protection the business purpose test affords. The court must therefore concentrate
on shaping another type of protection for the minority.
Defendant in Singer contended that if a shareholder's interest
is exclusively in the value of his investment, that right is protected
by the appraisal statute. 122 In theory, the availability of appraisal
119. "For many small companies, and some not so small, public ownership is
one of the bummers of business life today." Roscow, Hard Times for OTC Stocks,
FINANCIAL WORLD, June 12, 1974, at 30.
120. Borden, supra note 2, at 1006-07.
121. Id. at 1013 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
122. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 977 (Del. 1977), Some states afford
shareholders who dissent from fundamental corporate changes, such as mergers, the
right to demand cash for their stock. See, e.g., CAL. Corn'. CODE §§ 1300-1312 (West
1977 & Cum. Supp. 1978); N.Y. Bus. Corn. LAW § 910 (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.72 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978). In Delaware, § 262, the
appraisal provision, gives dissenters of the merged corporation the right of appraisal
if they comply with various procedural requirements. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262(b)-(d)
(1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977). An appraiser is then appointed to evaluate the dissenter's
shares. Id. § 262(f). The corporation's earnings, the market value of its stock, asset
value, dividend record, and other pertinent factors are considered in arriving at the
value of the stock. See Universal City Studies, Inc. v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 334
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guarantees that the minority's economic interest is protected,
thereby permitting the majority to consummate corporate changes
without objection. However, even if it can be called a remedy,
appraisal is totally unresponsive to the minority's needs. 123 As long
A.2d 216 (Del. 1975). Though the costs of the appraisal and the appraiser's fee can

be taxed to the parties as the court deems equitable, attorney's fees and expert's fees
must be borne by the individual shareholder, DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262(h) (Cum. Supp.
1977), resulting in, perhaps, a costly proceeding. See Brudney, A Note on "Going
Private," 61 VA. L. REV. 1019 (1975). Though corporate statutes are designed to pre-

vent undue obstruction of business decisions, the appraisal statute was designed to
protect minority shareholders from arbitrary action by compensating them for their
shares. The Delaware statute has, therefore, recently been amended to deal with
some of the inequities suffered by the minority. The most relevant section of the
amended statute attempts to alleviate some of the financial burden of the appraisal
remedy by spreading the costs of the proceeding. The statute provides:
[T]he Court may order all or a portion of the expenses incurred by any stockholder in connection with the appraisal proceeding, including, without
limitation, reasonable attorney's fees and the fees and expenses of experts, to
be charged pro rata against the value of all the shares entitled to an appraisal.
DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262(h) (Cum. Supp. 1977). Although this amendment was an
attempt to make appraisal a more viable remedy, the legislature has retained, in the
amended statute, the notion that the dissenter is entitled to the "fair value exclusive
of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the
merger." Id. § 262(f) (emphasis added). The new statute, therefore, affords little additional protection for the minority.
123. When corporations merge, the shareholder can acquiesce to merger or
seek an appraisal of his shares. In this respect, appraisal is a focal point in the relationship between the corporation and the stockholder. Appraisal has been called "the
quid pro quo for statutes giving the majority the right to override the veto" which a
single shareholder previously had over corporate combinations. Vorenberg, supra
note 5, at 1194 (footnote omitted). However, the process invariably "involves delay
and uncertainty, with expenses which may cut into [the minority shareholder's] recovery." Id. at 1201. Professor Vorenberg has also pointed out the difficulties of valuation inherent in the appraisal statutes as well as the difficulties of the procedural
requirements which may frustrate a dissenter's use of the remedy. Id. Finally,
appraisal statutes expressly deny the dissenter any share of the opportunity or increased value the corporation acquires by reason of the merger. Another commentator has noted that the expense and complexity involved in an action by the minority shareholders makes it "impossible for the majority stockholders not to be tempted
to undercompensate those they displace, and improbable that they will not yield to
the temptation." Brudney, supra note 122, at 1025. See also Eisenberg, The Legal
Rules of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate Decisionmaking, 57
CALIF. L. REv. 1, 85 (1969). Appraisal has been characterized as a "remedy of desperation," "expensive," and "uncertain in result." Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note
17, at 306-07. See also Comment, Protection of Minority Shareholdersfrom Freezeouts Through Merger, 22 WAYNE L. REv. 1421 (1976). Former SEC Commissioner
Sommer, speaking of appraisals, noted that "they take forever, and during that time
typically the dissatisfied shareholder is locked-in with an asset he can't sell and he
receives no dividends. Furthermore, these actions do not take that form most
dreaded by management, the class action .
Address of A.A. Sommer, Jr., supra
note 15, at 84,696.
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as appraisal statutes operate to keep the prospective gain in the
hands of the majority, they will not protect the minority. The task
of distributing postmerger gain is legislative, not judicial. If appraisal statutes could be modified to distribute insider profits among
the minority, as well as the majority, the deterrent effect would be
twofold.
First, if those who exercise control for their own benefit pay
an appropriate proportion of the gain to the minority as a premium
for this privilege, the minority is assured that their interest in the
corporation will not be contravened. Underlying the concern with
going private transactions is the recognition that inherent in any
concentration of authority or power is the potential for abuse
through self-dealing. Although Delaware courts have consistently
claimed that they do not permit mergers which benefit one class to
the exclusion and detriment of another, 124 they have not strictly
adhered to this notion. The Supreme Court of Delaware has recently commented that "[s]elf dealing occurs when the parent, by
virtue of its domination of the subsidiary, causes the subsidiary to
act in such a way that the parent receives something from the subsidiary to the exclusion of and detriment to, the minority stockholders of the subsidiary.' 1 25 The judicial objective has been to curb
the predatory appetite of the majority. However, employing the
business purpose test may prove inappropriate, since it may operate to nullify an otherwise legitimate merger. If the insiders contemplating taking a corporation private were compelled to share
the profits that would accrue from such a transaction with the
eliminated minority, this might prove adequate motivation to raise
the initial offer to the minority to avoid litigation by dissatisfied
minority interests. Thus, corporations could be assured the flexibility they desire, but the minority would also be assured meaningful
compensation for loss of their equity participation through the
payment of a premium.
Second, such a modified appraisal statute may also operate not
only to curtail insider self-dealing, but to provide indirectly a valid
business purpose before the corporation goes private. Much of the
124. See generally MacFarlane v. North American Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch.
172, 178, 157 A. 396, 398 (1928).
125. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971). In determining the legitimacy of the parent corporation's actions, the application of this standard
has been referred to as the "advantage-disadvantage" test. Note, The FiduciaryDuty
of Parent to Subsidiary Corporation, 57 VA. L. REV. 1223, 1237 (1971).
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objection to going private transactions centers on economic gain by
insiders at the expense of the minority. 12 6 However, a revised appraisal statute would not permit the insiders to divide the corporate assets so as to give themselves disproportionate benefits. If the
insiders knew that going private would force them to share their
profits by paying a premium to the minority shareholders, they
might be less willing to go private unless there is a good business
reason for doing so. Without sacrificing either corporate flexibility
or minority protection, the competing interests raised by such
transactions could be satisfied.
Finally, there is some fear that if controlling interests can compel the surrender of minority equity interests at will, the small
investor will lose faith in the marketplace, and the economy will
suffer. 127 However, if the insiders compensate the economic interests of the minority, adequate compensation would provide the
investor with funds to reinvest in an equally depressed market.
This compensation also protects the minority shareholder's interest
in minimizing his market losses.
Unfortunately, such a remedy was unavailable to the court in
Singer. The business purpose test alone, however, does not impose
any substantial check on the conduct of the majority in its dealings
with the minority. Recognizing the limitations of such a test, the
court noted that "as a threshold consideration . . . [the business
128
purpose test] is not helpful in sorting out rights of the parties."'
The court determined that the standards governing the relationship
between majority and minority shareholders is the important issue.

126. Typically, attacks on mergers involve complaints of disparate treatment by
the majority, especially with reference to the value exchanged at the time of the

merger. In Harriman v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 133 (D. Del.
1975), plaintiff argued that application of an intrinsic fairness test to mergers requires equal sharing of postmerger gain. Id. at 154. The court briefly summarized
Delaware's position on such a notion: Positing the existence of a gain-sharing requirement in Delaware is difficult "since the prevailing Delaware law on fairness
requires only that the consideration paid be equivalent to the premerger value of the
exchanged shares and pays no attention whatsoever to any resulting post-merger
gains." Id. at 154 & n.114 (emphasis added). At least one commentary has posited a
postmerger gain-sharing concept in the parent-subsidiary relationship where gainsharing provides the arms-length bargaining absent in dealings between entities so
closely related. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 17, at 322.
127. See Address of A.A. Sommer, Jr., supra note 15, at 84,695; Securities Act
Release No. 5884, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,366, at

88,735 (Nov. 17, 1977).
128. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976 (Del. 1977).
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FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS AND THE FAIRNESS TEST

Closely allied with the court's determination that the business
purpose test is inadequate to deal with questions raised by takeouts
is its reliance on another equitable limitation on the majority's
power: principles of fiduciary responsibility. Citing well-known Delaware authorities, the court stated: "It is a settled rule of law in
Delaware that . . . the majority stockholder . . . owe[s] to the
minority stockholders . . . a fiduciary obligation in dealing with the
latter's property."' 129 To the extent that takeouts enable insiders to
benefit themselves at the expense of the minority, these transactions raise serious questions concerning fiduciary duty. However,
merely recognizing the existence of such a duty does not describe
30
it.1
Corporate laws tend to be gracious to management: Delaware
is notorious for the favorable climate its laws provide. To attract
corporations and thereby raise revenue for the state, the Delaware
legislature created a corporate mecca. This policy has been perpetuated by the Delaware courts; they have encouraged freedom of
action on the part of a parent incorporated in the state, often with
general relaxation of the fiduciary standards and requirements of
fairness required by other states. 13 1 Until recently, it appeared that
Delaware had overcome any hostility it harbored towards takeouts
132
and had succumbed to the corporate hegemony.
The most frequently cited authority for the proposition that a
controlling shareholder occupies a position of trust is Pepper v. Lit-

129. Id. (citations omitted). The court scrutinized the fiduciary duty owed by
the majority independently of mere technical compliance with the statutory procedure. The court applied a very strict standard of fiduciary duty.
130. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943): "[T]o say that a man is a
fiduciary only begins the analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is
he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he
failed to discharge these obligations?" Id. at 85-86.
131. Delaware has received sharp criticism from those who believe its courts
often give little protection to the minority: "Delaware is both the sponsor and the
victim of a system contributing to the deterioration of corporation standards ....
In

the management of corporate affairs, state statutory and case law has always been
supreme .... " Cary, supra note 48, at 663.
"In the past, Delaware generally has taken the position that so long as resident
corporations followed the state's law to the letter-a law regarded as quite favorable
by corporate managers-they could do pretty much as they pleased." Metz, supra
note 67, at 52, col. 3.
132, See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349 (Del. Ch. 1976), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
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ton, 133 decided by the Supreme Court. This classic expression of
fiduciary obligation was echoed by the Delaware courts in Sterling
v. Mayflower Hotel Corp. 134 In Sterling the Supreme Court of Delaware, faced with a merger situation, held that "[s]ince [insiders]
stand on both sides of the transaction, they bear the burden of
establishing its entire fairness, and it must pass the test of careful
scrutiny by the courts."' 135 However, despite application of this
rather strict standard in some important cases, 136 there appeared to
be a retrenchment from this fairness doctrine as a standard for interested merger cases.
In Bruce v. E.L. Bruce Co., 1 37 the fairness standard was substantially eroded by requiring proof of bad faith or some actionable
fraud to invalidate the merger. The court noted that "absent fraud
or a showing that the terms of a proposed merger are so unfair as
to shock the conscience of the court it is the policy of the courts of
Delaware to permit contracting corporations to take advantage of
statutory devices for corporate consolidation." 3 8 The court found
appraisal the exclusive remedy for a dissenting shareholder and

133.

308 U.S. 295 (1939). In discussing the duties of controlling shareholders,

the Court commented:
Their dealings with the corporation are subjected to rigorous scrutiny and
where any of their contracts ... with the corporation [are] challenged the burden is on the director or stockholder not only to prove the good faith of the
transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the
corporation and those interested therein.
Id. at 306 (citation omitted). Courts of equity have always imposed a fiduciary duty
of good faith and fair dealing on the corporation's officers and directors to shield the
corporation and its stockholders from the dishonesty of those managing the corporation. When a controlling or majority shareholder is in a position to direct corporate
affairs and manipulate corporate decisions, this fiduciary responsibility attaches to
his actions as well. As Justice Brandeis noted: "The majority has the right to control;
but when it does so, it occupies a fiduciary relation toward the minority, as much so
as the corporation itself or its officers and directors." Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert,
250 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919). For a detailed discussion of the development of
fiduciary duty, see Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REv.
1049 (1931); Note, The Fiduciary Duties of Majority Shareholders Expanded: Jones
v. H.F. Ahmanson Co., 59 GEO. L.J. 209 (1970).
134. 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952). See also Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del.
1976); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939).
135. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 110 (Del. 1952).
136. See, e.g., Harriman v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 133
(D. Del. 1975); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch.
1968).
137. 40 Del. Ch. 80, 174 A.2d 29 (1961).
138. Id. at 82, 174 A.2d at 30 (citation omitted).
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never discussed the fairness of the proposed merger. One year
later in Stauffer v. Standard Brands Inc., 139 the court again refused to consider the substantive fairness of a merger. Confronted
with a short form merger, the court held that, in light of continuing legislative approval of mergers, "the very purpose of the
[merger] statute is to provide the parent corporation with a means
of eliminating the minority shareholder's interest in the enterprise."'140 The court's decision did not discuss fiduciary concepts.
The fairness doctrine received its most severe blow in David J.
Green & Co. v. Schenley Industries, Inc. 1 4 1 That decision involved a long form merger, analagous to Singer, where the parent
corporation, holding 84% of the subsidiary's stock, sought to takeout the minority through a merger. The court found that the Sterling fairness rule was applicable, yet concluded that since the rights
of minority shareholders under the long form merger provisions are
no greater than those under the short form merger statute, Stauffer
required appraisal as the exclusive remedy, absent a finding of
fraud. 142 An additional gloss on the Sterling doctrine was provided
by the court in Chasin v. Gluck.' 43 There, the court determined
that the intrinsic fairness rule of Sterling would not be triggered
absent a finding of self-dealing.- 4 4 Having eroded the minority's
protection to a fraud standard, appraisal became the exclusive rem139. 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (1962).

140. Id. at 10-11, 187 A.2d at 80. "This power of the parent corporation to
eliminate the minority is a complete answer to plaintiff's charge of breach of trust

.Id .
141.

281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971). "While a court of equity should stand ready

to prevent corporate fraud and any overreaching by fiduciaries ... this Court should
not impede the consummation of an orderly merger .... an efficient and fair method
having been furnished which permits a judicially protected withdrawal . . . by a
disgruntled stockholder." Id. at 36 (citation omitted).
142. Id. at 35.
143. 282 A.2d 188 (Del. Ch. 1971).
144. Id. at 191-92. Professor Folk has suggested that despite the affirmance of
the strict Sterling standard in David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d
427 (Del. Ch. 1968), it is unclear bow far the courts will go to scrutinize interested
mergers, in light of subsequent cases demonstrating a preference for use of the business judgment rule in areas traditionally subject to the fairness doctrine. E. FOLK,
supra note 55, at 334-35. See Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883 (Del.
1970); Muschel v. Western Union Corp., 310 A.2d 904 (Del. Ch. 1973). Other courts
have commented on the erosion of the fairness standard. See, e.g., Collins v. SEC,
532 F.2d 584, 597 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 815 (1976) (intrinsic fairness
test requires showing of palpable overreaching and self-dealing); Harriman v. E.I.
Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 133, 154 (D. Del. 1975) (in terms of result,
there is no significant difference between business judgment rule and rule of intrinsic fairness).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol6/iss4/4

32

Samuels: Delaware Reexamines its Merger Laws: New Protection for Minority
1978]

RIGHTS OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS

edy in interested merger cases with most corporate transactions
protected by the business judgment rule.

Faced with this precedent, the court in Singer employed an
interesting technique. The court distinguished those cases relied

upon by defendants which, although factually similar to Singer,
were not precedents for the Court's desired condemnation of the

transaction in Singer. Yet the court relied on other cases with distinguishable facts, since the language in those cases was helpful
to the court in reaching its conclusion.

The court noted that although the cases relied upon by defendants involved efforts to attack a merger, 145 none of the decisions

involved a straight cash-out.14 6 Reliance on the holdings of these

cases would have justified the Singer merger. To eliminate any
further confusion as to the status of these authorities, the court
commented that any statement in these cases "which seems to be
' 14 7
in conflict with what is said herein must be deemed overruled.'
The court proceeded to rely on a series of cases, none of which
involved mergers, and concluded that if use of corporate power to

perpetuate control is a violation of fiduciary obligations, use of the
corporate machinery to eliminate the minority must also be a viola-

tion. 148 Consequently, all future mergers must assert a business
145. MacCrone v. American Capital Corp., 51 F. Supp. 462 (D. Del. 1943)
(reasons for mergers are not for judicial determination); Bruce v. E.L. Bruce Co., 40
Del. Ch. 80, 174 A.2d 29 (1961) (Delaware permits contracting corporations to consolidate as long as proposed terms do not shock conscience); Stauffer v. Standard

Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (1962) (purpose of merger statute is to
provide means of eliminating minority interest).
146. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 978 (Del. 1977).
147. Id. at 979.
148. The court relied mainly on Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del.
Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (1967). There, the propriety of the issuance and exchange of
authorized but unissued stock was challenged. The transaction was held to be impermissible because the use of corporate funds merely to gain control unjustifiably
strikes at
the very heart of corporate representation by causing a stockholder with an
equitable right

. . .

to have his right to a proportionate voice ...

in corporate

affairs to be diminished by the simple act of an exchange of stock which
brought no money into the . . . treasury
...proper corporate purpose ....

. . .

[and] was not connected with a

Id. at 365, 230 A.2d at 777. See also Petty v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140
(Del. Ch. 1975) (use of corporate funds to perpetuate control impermissible); Bennett
v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 99 A.2d 236 (Del. Ch. 1953) (though in compliance with
statutory procedure, court canceled stock issuance where it was intended to force
minority stockholders out of corporation on majority's terms); Starring v. American
Hair & Felt Co., 21 Del. Ch. 380, 191 A. 887 (1937) (plan of redemption enjoined
since its purpose was to rid corporation of class of stockholders by compelling them
to sell out to majority).
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purpose other than the freezeout of the minority and must comply

with the Sterling rule of "entire fairness" which governs the
fiduciary obligation imposed on the majority in its dealings with the
1 49
minority.
Inasmuch as the minority shareholder's interest is monetary,

the court could have focused the fairness inquiry on the price offered in the takeout. However, this portion of the court's decision
again lacks in definition. If the permissibility of future mergers

rests on a determination of their fairness, the court has provided
little guidance to the businessman planning a transaction or to a

lower court judging its validity. Fairness is an elusive standard subject to ad hoc determination by a court. Since such a standard is
usually applied after the fact of merger, it assures only superficial

objectivity, and little else. The fairness standard thrusts the court
into the decisionmaking process of the corporation where, tra-

ditionally, the business judgment rule foreclosed such control.150
One commentator has noted that "[t]he quest for 'fairness' also leads
the chancellor into new fields where he is normally not expert. It
places on him the heavy burden of solving complex economic
problems in order to formulate a judgment as to soundness, and
hence the fairness of the proposed amendment." 1'5 Whether the

court will now sit as an ill-equipped member of the board of directors in determining the viability of various corporate transforma-

tions is unclear. Indeed, the majority offers no clue as to what factors
should be considered in determining a transaction's entire fairness.
THE CONCURRENCE

Justice McNeilly's concurring opinion, although also a departure from precedent, attempted to establish guidelines for future
149. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977).
150. It has long been accepted that absent a showing of bad faith, a court will
not interfere with the discretion of directors. The acts of directors are afforded a
presumption of good faith. See Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148, 221 A.2d 487
(1966). The Delaware Supreme Court recently commented: "A board of directors
enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment, and its decisions will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational business purpose. A court under such
circumstances will not substitute its own notions of what is or is not sound business
judgment." Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (emphasis
added).
151. Gibson, supra note 62, at 296. See 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW
FRAUD: SEC RULE 10b-5, § 12.5, at 275-76 (1967). "The price of such a flexible
criterion as fairness includes high variability of results and large potential for dissatisfaction with them." Id. at 275.
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cases. Though he agreed that a business purpose is one factor to be

considered, he added that the court should also scrutinize "economic necessity, desirability and feasibility involved, evidence of

self-serving, manipulation, or overreaching, and all other relevant factors of intrinsic fairness or unfairness."' 152 Although Justice
McNeilly emphasized substantive issues rather than slogans, his
inquiry was still not directed at preventing specific harm to the
minority. Fairness is a step in the right direction, but alone it does

not afford the minority enough protection.
Tanzer: A STEP IN RETREAT
Tanzer v. International General Industries, Inc., 15 3 was decided by the Supreme Court of Delaware less than one month after
Singer. Returning to the question of when a parent can eliminate a
minority interest in a subsidiary, the court held that a merger
which primarily advances the business interests of the parent or
controlling shareholder is permissible under Delaware law. 154 International General Industries, Inc. (IGI), a Delaware corporation,
owned 81% of the outstanding common stock of Kliklok Corp.
(Klildok), also a Delaware corporation. As part of a merger plan to
acquire all of Kliklok's common stock and eliminate the minority
interest, IGI created KLK, a wholly owned subsidiary. As controlling shareholder of Kliklok, IGI approved the merger of KLK and
Kliklok on a cash for stock basis. Plaintiffs, minority stockholders of
Kliklok, argued that since the merger advanced only the interests of
155
the parent, IGI, the merger should be enjoined.

In Singer the court had grappled with whether the business
purpose test was appropriately applied to the parent or to the subsidiary, but left the question unanswered. 156 However, in Tanzer,

there was no contention that the merger benefited the subsidiary.
152. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 982 (Del. 1977) (McNeilly, J., concurring).
153. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977). For further discussion of Tanzer, see Borden,
Delaware Speaks Out Again On Takeouts, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 25, 1977, at 1, col. 2.
154. Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1125 (Del. 1977).
155. Id. at 1123. Discussing Singer's holding that elimination of the minority as
the sole purpose for a merger is a violation of fiduciary principles, the court noted:
"In one sense, [such elimination] may be said to be what is involved in the Kliklok
merger because the minority were cashed out and it is not contended ... that Kliklok benefited from the merger." Id. However, the court determined that the focus of
its decision should not be on the minority, but rather on the right of IGI as a majority shareholder to effect a merger for its own corporate interest. Id. at 1124.
156. See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 n.11 (Del. 1977).
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The issue posed was whether a parent or majority shareholder
could effect a merger solely for its own corporate benefit or
whether such action would violate a fiduciary duty. 157 The court
recognized that, rather than an analysis in terms of business purof the competing rights of the
pose, an analysis, as in Singer,
158
majority and minority is useful.
The court noted that, although Singer concentrated on the
rights of the minority, majority stockholders also have rights to be
protected.' 59 IGI, although holding the controlling interest in Klik]ok, was also a shareholder. The distinction between a majority
shareholder exercising his ownership rights as opposed to acting in
his control capacity creates a dichotomy in corporate theory:
Fiduciary obligations only attach to the majority shareholder's actions when he is exercising control.' 60 The court resolved this
dichotomy by focusing on IGI's status as a stockholder of Kliklok.
The court noted that "a stockholder in a Delaware corporation has
a right to vote his shares in his own interest, including the expectation of personal profit, limited, of course, by any duty he owes to
other stockholders.' 6 1 From this premise, the court's decision is a
foregone conclusion. IGI's action is not a per se violation as in
Singer. Moreover, this same court recently held in Sinclair Oil
Corp. v. Levien' 6 2 that self-dealing occurs when a parent manipu-

lates a subsidiary so as to reap a benefit to the exclusion of the
subsidiary. 163 Curiously, however, the court's decision in Tanzer
lacks the heavy reliance on fiduciary principles evident in Singer,
perhaps because single-minded focus on fiduciary principles or
even on the advantage-disadvantage test of Sinclair Oil'6 3 would
nullify the merger. Although the court in Tanzer began its opinion
by discarding the business purpose test, Singer is still to be
reckoned with: Not only must a merger comply with "entire fair157. Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1123 (Del. 1977).
158. Id. at 1123.
159. Id.
160. See Note, The Fiduciary Duties of Majority ShareholdersExpanded: Jones
v. H.F. Ahmanson Co., 59 GEO. L.J. 209, 213-14 (1970).
161. Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1124 (Del. 1977).
The court stated that it would be unfair to judge only IGI's "director control of Kliklok which is a consequence of its power and not the source thereof." Id. at 1123.
Indeed, since IGI caused the merger because it voted as a stockholder, this is the
status by which its interests should be measured. See id.
162. 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
163, Id. at 720.
164. See note 125 supra.
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ness," but the business purpose asserted "must not be suspect as
a subterfuge, the real purpose of which is to rid itself of unwanted
minority shareholders in the subsidiary.' ' 1 6 5 Again, the still undefined and ostensibly discarded concept of valid business purpose
recurs in the court's holding as a measure of the validity of future
mergers.
The Chancellor, in the decision below, had found that IGI's
purpose in causing the merger was to facilitate its long term debt
financing.16 6 Accepting this as a valid business purpose, the court
of chancery discussed fairness only with reference to the price offered to the minority.16 7 On appeal, however, the supreme court
held that this was too restrictive a view of the Sterling test: "The
test required by Singer, which applied the rule of Sterling, involves
judicial scrutiny for 'entire fairness' as to all aspects of the transaction. '"168 Once again, the court declined to articulate guidelines for
the application of this standard as a mechanism to protect minority
shareholders' rights.
Although it is unclear how the court's decision protects the
minority, Tanzer will probably restore Delaware to good favor with
corporate management. As an indication of how Delaware will deal
with future corporate takeouts, the decision is somewhat clearer. In
light of Tanzer, Singer appears to be no more than a warning to
those enterprises contemplating takeouts that most forms of corporate takeouts will be condoned, except those so egregious as to
shock the conscience of even the Delaware courts. Tanzer was a
retreat from the departure from precedent established by Singer,
which afforded new protection to minority shareholders. In light
of Tanzer, Singer seems to have even less application to its own
facts, since Singer's only impact can be expected to be in true going
private transactions. Thus, Delaware seems to be following in New
York's footsteps, returning the balance to one favoring corporate
management.
CONCLUSION

The amorphous standard of the business purpose test as a limitation on the majority's power to effect a merger rests on the prem165. Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1124 (Del. 1977).
166. Id. (quoting Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., C.A. No. 4945 (Del.

Ch. Dec. 23, 1975)).
167.

Id. at 1125 (discussing Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., C.A. No.

4945 (Del. Ch. Dec. 23, 1975)).
168.

Id.
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ise that appraisal is an inadequate remedy to insure fairness in
the majority's dealings with the minority. Designed to insure greater fairness to the minority, the business purpose test reflects traditional notions of the controlling shareholder's fiduciary duty to
the corporation and to those acting on its behalf. 169 By focusing on
the corporation, this test does not effectively check the majority's
conduct towards the minority, and therefore fails to achieve its
purpose. This failure is evident in Tanzer, where the court held
that if a merger advances solely the business purpose of the parent
corporation, it is permissible, even if the minority shareholders of
the subsidiary are squeezed out. How such a standard protects the
minority remains obscure. In addition, while both Singer and Tanzer profess to discard the business purpose test, the test finds its
way back into the courts' holdings; yet both holdings lack needed
definition.
If Tanzer and Singer indicate Delaware's direction in dealing
with mergers, most mergers will probably pass scrutiny, as long as
they are not blatant grabs for power, even where the minority is
cashed out. The effect is to sift out the true going private transaction where aggrandizement of the controlling shareholders' purse is
the only motive. However, the minority has again been overlooked. Permitting various corporate combinations without awarding a share of the synergistic value to those cashed out in the
transaction continues to sacrifice minority rights to corporate flexibility. The analysis of the business purpose test by the Delaware
Supreme Court avoids the necessary confrontation with the problems inherent in protecting the minority interests: the inadequacy
of the present appraisal statute and the failure to recognize the
minority's interest as monetary.
The minority interests are placated by the resurrection of the
fairness doctrine of Sterling.170 Indeed, use of an intrinsic fairness
169.

See Solomon, Going Private: Business Practices,Legal Mechanics,Judicial

Standards and Proposalsfor Reform, 25 BUFFALO L. REv. 141, 168 (1975).
170. Neither Tanzer nor Singer set out any guidelines for the use of the "entire
fairness" standard. In Tanzer the lower court, having made the initial determination
of business purpose, confined further inquiry to adequacy of the proffered consideration. Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1125 (Del. 1977).
However, the Supreme Court of Delaware noted that entire fairness must be applied
to all aspects of the transaction, of which price is only one factor. Id. Though the
supreme court gave no guidance, the lower court was probably relying on the various
factors set out in Sterling which appear to be directed solely at price:
[A]II relevant value figures of both corporations may be examined and compared in order to arrive at a decision as to the fairness of the plan. Thus,
while not determinative, nevertheless, the value of each corporation for var-
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test may create obstacles for many corporations. The prospect of
judicial intervention may unnecessarily inhibit the flexibility and
efficiency essential to corporate life. But is it the corporation's actions we wish to obstruct? If Delaware intends to reinstate minority
rule in the distribution of corporate power, especially given the
traditional preference for corporate management, such a decision

should be predicated on a more predictable standard than "entire
fairness."
If Delaware follows New York's lead, corporate management
need not fear significant restraints on its flexibility in corporate affairs. Only egregious mergers will be outlawed, and these probably
could have been dealt with under traditional fiduciary standards
without the infusion of a business purpose test or an ad hoc fairness
standard into corporate law.

On the other hand, Delaware may actively pursue the fairness
standard, thereby forcing the majority to deal fairly with the minority. Though Singer specifically limited its holding to long form mergers, the court of chancery has recently extended the Sterling fairness requirement to short form mergers as well. 1 71 Indeed, it can
be expected that the court of chancery will be inundated with cases
attempting to delineate further Delaware's attitude towards corporate combinations. 17 2 For the minority, though fairness is a step in
the right direction, it does not go far enough to equalize bargaining

power. Moreover, the intrinsic fairness test was eroded once before
ious purposes, e.g., going concern value, book value, net asset value, market
value, is pertinent to the issue presented.
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 20, 28, 89 A.2d 862, 867 (1952). This

definition was incorporated into the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Sterling.
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 115 (Del. 1952).
171. Kemp v. Angel, 381 A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1977). The court in Kemp, referring to language in Singer, noted that there is no reason why the duty imposed on a
majority stockholder in a short form merger should be subject to less scrutiny than
the duty imposed in a long form merger. Despite the court's ruling in Stauffer v.
Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch.7, 187 A.2d 78 (1962), that the very purpose of the
merger statute was to enable the majority to eliminate a minority interest, short form
mergers will now be subject to the "entire fairness" doctrine. See id.
172. See Young v. Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch.1978). In Young the court
found that the business purpose was contrived since the merger was an attempt to circumvent a specific charter provision. The fairness inquiry centered on the price paid
to the minority shareholders. Id. at 1377-78. In another recent case, Najjar v. Roland
Int'l Corp., [1978] 455 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-2 to A-3 (Del. Ch. May 8, 1978),
the court fndicated that a complaint that alleges that a merger's sole purpose is to
eliminate minority interests "is now virtually immune from a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action .... especially when the basis for such a motion [is
the] amount paid for the minority shares." Id. at A-2.
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to a fraud standard and only revived to combat what the court considered a true evil: going private. Once a court confronts the
merits of permitting certain combinations, the fairness test may
again be eviscerated to require proof of self-dealing. Indeed, if the
court's requirement of a plausible business purpose is easily met
without regard to the effect on the minority, it is likely that the
fairness requirement will give rise to only a pro forma hearing to
satisfy a dissident minority. If so, the minority will be in no better
position than it was before Singer. To attack a merger, the minority
will be forced to prove fraud, which is difficult. Application and
expansion of the fairness doctrine will make Delaware a less attractive corporate home if the legitimacy of a corporation's actions is
determined on a case-by-case basis. Application of a fairness standard, an extreme example of a court exercising equitable discretion, has no place in corporate combinations so fundamental to the
function of corporation life.
Whether Delaware chooses to gloss over the business purpose
test and permit most corporate combinations or to expand further
the fairness doctrine, the minority remains relatively unprotected.
The economic interest of the minority must be recognized as the
essence of the conflict produced by going private transactions before the minority will receive any substantial protection. Blinded
by traditional precepts, the court in Singer was unable to recognize
that corporate combinations of all kinds can and should be permitted as long as minority shareholders are compensated for what they
are asked to relinquish.
Lynn F. Sainuels
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